Thank you for another great article! For my part, I'd like to share with you interesting inroads to libertarian theory of war from Ukrainian libertarian thinker, Volodymyr Zolotorov, in his foreword to the Ukrainian edition of Hoppe’s “The Myth of National Defense" translated into English https://medium.com/@vzolotorov/state-national-defense-russia-ukraine-war-and-libertarianism-94359a13b9ca You might find this interesting and in line with your your criticism of libertarian pacifism.
In recent decades, there has been a noticeable shift in some areas of social science and international law toward methodological statism or holism. This perspective focuses on states or institutions as primary units of analysis, often sidelining individual agency. For instance, in international law scholarship, there's a prevalent trend of emphasizing state actions over individual practices, leading to a form of methodological statism .
This shift can result in analyses that prioritize large-scale data—such as casualty statistics or economic indicators—over the nuanced motivations and actions of individuals. While such aggregate data provide valuable insights, an overreliance on them may obscure the underlying individual behaviors that drive social phenomena.
Critics argue that methodological individualism has been conflated with reductionism, leading to its diminished application. However, scholars like Francesco Di Iorio advocate for a non-reductionist variant of methodological individualism. This approach recognizes the complexity of social systems and the interplay between individual actions and structural constraints, without reducing social phenomena solely to individual components .
Reengaging with methodological individualism can enrich our understanding of social dynamics by highlighting how individual actions contribute to larger social patterns. Balancing individual-level analyses with aggregate data ensures a more comprehensive approach to studying social phenomena.
If you're interested in exploring this topic further, I can recommend specific readings or discuss how methodological individualism applies to particular areas of social science.
Jacob, this article offered a sharp and much-needed re-centering of libertarian anti-war thinking on methodological individualism. Your critique of collectivist reasoning—especially the tendency to flatten moral judgment into nation-level guilt—is incisive and has genuinely made me reassess how I’ve approached anti-war arguments in the past. The reminder that war is not a monolith but a sum of individual actions resonates.
That said, your piece also raised a tricky question for me: how do we maintain individual moral assessment when agency is blurred or fragmented? Take conscripted soldiers—many of whom act under duress—or civilians shaped by state propaganda to the point of internalizing collective ideologies. More urgently, how does this framework hold up when decision-making is increasingly automated, as with autonomous AI in warfare? In such cases, can all actors still be held meaningfully responsible as individuals?
I fully support the pushback against collectivist guilt, but I wonder if methodological individualism needs to be stretched—or adapted—to address the complexity of these modern wartime dynamics. Curious to hear how you see that tension playing out.
This piece offered a bracing and much-needed correction to how anti-war arguments often drift into vague collectivism, even within libertarian thought. Your insistence on methodological individualism reminded me why I was drawn to libertarian principles in the first place—it demands moral clarity, even in the fog of war. I hadn’t fully recognized how common it is to flatten agency into abstractions like “the military” or “the people,” and your argument helped shift my perspective there.
Jacob’s critique of collectivist anti-war reasoning within libertarian circles is sharp and thought-provoking. His insistence on methodological individualism is a timely reminder that moral analysis should not be blurred by aggregates like “states” or “peoples.” The article challenged how I’ve often approached wartime ethics—especially the reflex to assign moral innocence or guilt en masse.
That said, I wonder how this framework handles cases where individual agency is obscured or fragmented. Take conscripted soldiers operating under coercion, or populations subject to systematic propaganda—can they be held fully accountable as moral agents? Even more complex is the rise of autonomous systems in warfare. If an AI drone makes a lethal decision, who bears the moral responsibility?
The commitment to individualism is compelling, but do we risk oversimplifying morally ambiguous roles in war by insisting that responsibility must always map cleanly to discrete agents? I’m not suggesting we default to collectivism, but perhaps there's a middle ground that recognizes diminished or distributed agency without abandoning individualist principles.
Curious to hear how this tension fits into your broader view.
Jacob, your piece delivers a sharp and much-needed critique of how collectivist assumptions often creep into libertarian anti-war rhetoric, especially in the form of aggregated suffering and body counts. Your defense of methodological individualism as a lens through which to view wartime ethics is both bracing and clarifying—it’s shifted how I think about moral culpability in conflict.
That said, I wonder how your framework handles cases where moral agency is deeply fragmented. For instance, can we meaningfully assess the moral responsibility of conscripted soldiers who act under duress, or of civilians molded by relentless state propaganda? The challenge becomes even thornier with the emergence of AI-directed warfare—who exactly bears the moral weight there?
Your piece rightly demands that we avoid collapsing individuals into abstract groups, but I’m curious whether there are situations where full moral individualism becomes difficult to apply. Do we risk losing nuance if we treat all wartime actors as equally capable moral agents?
Thanks again for pushing the conversation forward—it’s rare to read something that reframes such a well-trodden debate so effectively.
This is a sharp and timely critique. The tension between methodological individualism and aggregate-level analysis—especially in conflict studies or large-scale sociopolitical events—often gets papered over in favor of dramatic statistics. It's striking how easily the individual gets abstracted into a data point, especially when the narrative focus shifts to body counts or systemic outcomes. Perhaps this is inevitable in large-scale analysis, but we still need frameworks that can re-integrate individual agency and experience without losing explanatory power. Curious to hear others’ thoughts—how do we preserve the nuance of individual behavior in macro-level research?
This piece sharpened my thinking on how libertarian discourse sometimes slips into collectivist reasoning when addressing war. Your critique of body-count arguments that implicitly treat “soldiers” or “civilians” as blocs was especially clarifying. Re-centering methodological individualism in this context feels overdue, and you make the case with rigor.
That said, I wonder how your framework handles cases where individual moral agency is compromised or diluted—such as conscripted soldiers acting under duress, civilians shaped by state propaganda, or autonomous weapons systems making lethal decisions. If we’re committed to analyzing war through the lens of individual action and responsibility, how do we assess culpability when individual intent is murky or fractured?
Can we meaningfully hold every wartime actor accountable as a discrete moral agent? Or are there edge cases where collective dynamics genuinely obscure individual moral evaluation? I’m not suggesting a return to collectivism—just curious where you see the limits of methodological individualism in war ethics.
Thanks for pushing this conversation forward. This article made me reconsider some assumptions I hadn’t realized I was making.
Jacob, this article pushed me to rethink how libertarians approach war criticism. Your defense of methodological individualism is sharp and necessary—especially in a space where moral outrage can lead to sweeping collectivist claims.
That said, I wonder how this framework handles murky cases of agency—like conscripted soldiers, populations shaped by state propaganda, or the rise of AI in warfare. Can all actors meaningfully be held accountable as individuals when their choices are so constrained or diffused?
Would be interested to hear how your view handles those gray areas.
Thank you for another great article! For my part, I'd like to share with you interesting inroads to libertarian theory of war from Ukrainian libertarian thinker, Volodymyr Zolotorov, in his foreword to the Ukrainian edition of Hoppe’s “The Myth of National Defense" translated into English https://medium.com/@vzolotorov/state-national-defense-russia-ukraine-war-and-libertarianism-94359a13b9ca You might find this interesting and in line with your your criticism of libertarian pacifism.
I agree with his analysis of the anatomy of the state.
I particularly agree with this argument:
-Many Western libertarians failed to respond coherently to the Russia-Ukraine war.
-Anti-war rhetoric often plays into the aggressor’s hands.
Libertarians should:
-Recognize the aggressor and the victim
-Support voluntary aid and arms to victims
-Oppose state funding or centralization of foreign aid
-Clarify the libertarian theory of war beyond slogans
Interesting recent talk on libertarian view on war and peace in MENA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8h-ZEF_5fKM too.
Thank you, Alexander, for you continuous support.
I will look into it
In recent decades, there has been a noticeable shift in some areas of social science and international law toward methodological statism or holism. This perspective focuses on states or institutions as primary units of analysis, often sidelining individual agency. For instance, in international law scholarship, there's a prevalent trend of emphasizing state actions over individual practices, leading to a form of methodological statism .
plato.stanford.edu
+2
journals.law.harvard.edu
+2
yumpu.com
+2
This shift can result in analyses that prioritize large-scale data—such as casualty statistics or economic indicators—over the nuanced motivations and actions of individuals. While such aggregate data provide valuable insights, an overreliance on them may obscure the underlying individual behaviors that drive social phenomena.
en.wikipedia.org
+2
plato.stanford.edu
+2
researchgate.net
+2
Reevaluating Methodological Individualism
Critics argue that methodological individualism has been conflated with reductionism, leading to its diminished application. However, scholars like Francesco Di Iorio advocate for a non-reductionist variant of methodological individualism. This approach recognizes the complexity of social systems and the interplay between individual actions and structural constraints, without reducing social phenomena solely to individual components .
duncanlaw.wordpress.com
+2
academia.edu
+2
researchgate.net
+2
Reengaging with methodological individualism can enrich our understanding of social dynamics by highlighting how individual actions contribute to larger social patterns. Balancing individual-level analyses with aggregate data ensures a more comprehensive approach to studying social phenomena.
If you're interested in exploring this topic further, I can recommend specific readings or discuss how methodological individualism applies to particular areas of social science.
Sources
Nice post
Jacob, this article offered a sharp and much-needed re-centering of libertarian anti-war thinking on methodological individualism. Your critique of collectivist reasoning—especially the tendency to flatten moral judgment into nation-level guilt—is incisive and has genuinely made me reassess how I’ve approached anti-war arguments in the past. The reminder that war is not a monolith but a sum of individual actions resonates.
That said, your piece also raised a tricky question for me: how do we maintain individual moral assessment when agency is blurred or fragmented? Take conscripted soldiers—many of whom act under duress—or civilians shaped by state propaganda to the point of internalizing collective ideologies. More urgently, how does this framework hold up when decision-making is increasingly automated, as with autonomous AI in warfare? In such cases, can all actors still be held meaningfully responsible as individuals?
I fully support the pushback against collectivist guilt, but I wonder if methodological individualism needs to be stretched—or adapted—to address the complexity of these modern wartime dynamics. Curious to hear how you see that tension playing out.
Do all wartime actors can meaningfully be held morally accountable as individuals.?
This piece offered a bracing and much-needed correction to how anti-war arguments often drift into vague collectivism, even within libertarian thought. Your insistence on methodological individualism reminded me why I was drawn to libertarian principles in the first place—it demands moral clarity, even in the fog of war. I hadn’t fully recognized how common it is to flatten agency into abstractions like “the military” or “the people,” and your argument helped shift my perspective there.
Jacob’s critique of collectivist anti-war reasoning within libertarian circles is sharp and thought-provoking. His insistence on methodological individualism is a timely reminder that moral analysis should not be blurred by aggregates like “states” or “peoples.” The article challenged how I’ve often approached wartime ethics—especially the reflex to assign moral innocence or guilt en masse.
That said, I wonder how this framework handles cases where individual agency is obscured or fragmented. Take conscripted soldiers operating under coercion, or populations subject to systematic propaganda—can they be held fully accountable as moral agents? Even more complex is the rise of autonomous systems in warfare. If an AI drone makes a lethal decision, who bears the moral responsibility?
The commitment to individualism is compelling, but do we risk oversimplifying morally ambiguous roles in war by insisting that responsibility must always map cleanly to discrete agents? I’m not suggesting we default to collectivism, but perhaps there's a middle ground that recognizes diminished or distributed agency without abandoning individualist principles.
Curious to hear how this tension fits into your broader view.
Jacob, your piece delivers a sharp and much-needed critique of how collectivist assumptions often creep into libertarian anti-war rhetoric, especially in the form of aggregated suffering and body counts. Your defense of methodological individualism as a lens through which to view wartime ethics is both bracing and clarifying—it’s shifted how I think about moral culpability in conflict.
That said, I wonder how your framework handles cases where moral agency is deeply fragmented. For instance, can we meaningfully assess the moral responsibility of conscripted soldiers who act under duress, or of civilians molded by relentless state propaganda? The challenge becomes even thornier with the emergence of AI-directed warfare—who exactly bears the moral weight there?
Your piece rightly demands that we avoid collapsing individuals into abstract groups, but I’m curious whether there are situations where full moral individualism becomes difficult to apply. Do we risk losing nuance if we treat all wartime actors as equally capable moral agents?
Thanks again for pushing the conversation forward—it’s rare to read something that reframes such a well-trodden debate so effectively.
Wow wonderful article 👏👏 I never thought about it... Great information and your thoughts are great.. thanks for sharing this post.
Informative and useful information.
Amezing informative.
This is a sharp and timely critique. The tension between methodological individualism and aggregate-level analysis—especially in conflict studies or large-scale sociopolitical events—often gets papered over in favor of dramatic statistics. It's striking how easily the individual gets abstracted into a data point, especially when the narrative focus shifts to body counts or systemic outcomes. Perhaps this is inevitable in large-scale analysis, but we still need frameworks that can re-integrate individual agency and experience without losing explanatory power. Curious to hear others’ thoughts—how do we preserve the nuance of individual behavior in macro-level research?
This piece sharpened my thinking on how libertarian discourse sometimes slips into collectivist reasoning when addressing war. Your critique of body-count arguments that implicitly treat “soldiers” or “civilians” as blocs was especially clarifying. Re-centering methodological individualism in this context feels overdue, and you make the case with rigor.
That said, I wonder how your framework handles cases where individual moral agency is compromised or diluted—such as conscripted soldiers acting under duress, civilians shaped by state propaganda, or autonomous weapons systems making lethal decisions. If we’re committed to analyzing war through the lens of individual action and responsibility, how do we assess culpability when individual intent is murky or fractured?
Can we meaningfully hold every wartime actor accountable as a discrete moral agent? Or are there edge cases where collective dynamics genuinely obscure individual moral evaluation? I’m not suggesting a return to collectivism—just curious where you see the limits of methodological individualism in war ethics.
Thanks for pushing this conversation forward. This article made me reconsider some assumptions I hadn’t realized I was making.
Jacob, this article pushed me to rethink how libertarians approach war criticism. Your defense of methodological individualism is sharp and necessary—especially in a space where moral outrage can lead to sweeping collectivist claims.
That said, I wonder how this framework handles murky cases of agency—like conscripted soldiers, populations shaped by state propaganda, or the rise of AI in warfare. Can all actors meaningfully be held accountable as individuals when their choices are so constrained or diffused?
Would be interested to hear how your view handles those gray areas.
Very informative article. Thank you
Very nice post.