Jacob's article offers a sharp and necessary critique of how anti-war arguments within libertarian circles can slip into collectivist reasoning—treating states, armies, or even entire populations as moral agents. His insistence on methodological individualism rightly redirects focus to the actual moral unit: the individual.
Jacob's article offers a sharp and necessary critique of how anti-war arguments within libertarian circles can slip into collectivist reasoning—treating states, armies, or even entire populations as moral agents. His insistence on methodological individualism rightly redirects focus to the actual moral unit: the individual.
That said, the application of this framework raises hard questions in situations where moral agency is deeply fragmented. How should we assess responsibility in the case of conscripted soldiers compelled under threat, or civilians swept up by relentless propaganda? What about decisions made by autonomous weapons or AI-driven systems with minimal human oversight? If the line between voluntary action and coercion becomes blurred, does moral accountability still lie with the individual—or does it diffuse into the system?
These are not just edge cases; they define much of modern conflict. I’m curious how methodological individualism can be meaningfully applied when the very conditions of war seem designed to erode individual autonomy. Can we hold all wartime actors to the same moral standard, or does the framework itself need to adjust when agency is compromised?
Looking forward to seeing how Jacob—or others—would address these tensions without retreating into collectivism.
Jacob's article offers a sharp and necessary critique of how anti-war arguments within libertarian circles can slip into collectivist reasoning—treating states, armies, or even entire populations as moral agents. His insistence on methodological individualism rightly redirects focus to the actual moral unit: the individual.
That said, the application of this framework raises hard questions in situations where moral agency is deeply fragmented. How should we assess responsibility in the case of conscripted soldiers compelled under threat, or civilians swept up by relentless propaganda? What about decisions made by autonomous weapons or AI-driven systems with minimal human oversight? If the line between voluntary action and coercion becomes blurred, does moral accountability still lie with the individual—or does it diffuse into the system?
These are not just edge cases; they define much of modern conflict. I’m curious how methodological individualism can be meaningfully applied when the very conditions of war seem designed to erode individual autonomy. Can we hold all wartime actors to the same moral standard, or does the framework itself need to adjust when agency is compromised?
Looking forward to seeing how Jacob—or others—would address these tensions without retreating into collectivism.