Over the past few years, the approach to Middle East peacemaking has oscillated between backroom dealings and highly public negotiations. In 2020, the Trump administration brokered the Abraham Accords largely behind closed doors, unveiling the Israel-Arab normalization agreements as a surprise success [1]. By contrast, in 2023 the Biden administration's efforts to forge a Saudi-Israeli normalization were conducted in full public view – with near-daily media leaks and commentary – which may have inadvertently invited sabotage. Indeed, U.S. officials acknowledged that Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel was likely aimed at derailing the very public Saudi-Israel talks [2]. The aftermath saw Iran and its allies openly celebrate how the war froze the normalization process, believing Israel's forceful response in Gaza would tarnish its global image and scuttle any Arab-Israeli deal [3][4]. Now, with Donald Trump eyeing another Middle East diplomatic push, many wonder if he is deliberately reverting to secret diplomacy – minimizing Israel's visibility in dealings with Saudi Arabia – to avoid the pitfalls of 2023. This essay evaluates Trump's current behavior in that context, the historical logic that secret negotiations often work best in the region, and the likelihood that Saudi-Israeli normalization will resume only after a U.S.-Saudi nuclear pact and a Gaza ceasefire are in place.
The 2020 Abraham Accords and Their Success Through Secret Negotiations
The Abraham Accords of 2020 stand as a showcase of secret diplomacy in action. Jared Kushner and Trump's team conducted normalization talks between Israel and several Arab states almost entirely behind the scenes, outside traditional State Department channels [1]. This clandestine approach meant there was little public hint of the breakthrough until it was nearly finalized, minimizing opportunities for hardline spoilers to intervene. Even Israel's own government was largely kept in the dark – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later admitted he concealed the UAE negotiations from coalition partners at Washington's request [5]. By the time the accords were announced and signed in September 2020, they came as a pleasant shock to the world, allowing the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco to establish ties with Israel amid an atmosphere of surprise optimism. Observers noted that these deals shattered the old notion that Arab states would require a Palestinian peace first [1][6]. In short, secrecy enabled an "outside-in" peace: Arab leaders could negotiate freely, shielded from public backlash until they were ready to present the agreement as a fait accompli. This strategy succeeded on its own terms – normalizing relations and even garnering Trump a reputation as a regional dealmaker – while avoiding the immediate blowback that might have killed the deals in infancy. However, as later events revealed, sidelining the Palestinian issue entirely also stored up resentment (particularly among Palestinians and Iran), a point we return to later.
2023: Public Saudi-Israel Talks and Their Fallout
In stark contrast, the 2023 attempt to broker Saudi-Israel normalization was anything but secret. Throughout that year, news outlets regularly leaked details of U.S.-mediated talks: Saudi Arabia's conditions for U.S. security guarantees and nuclear assistance, Israel's possible concessions, and timelines for a deal were endlessly analyzed in public. This high visibility proved double-edged. On one hand, it signaled diplomatic momentum; on the other, it gave adversaries time to mobilize against the potential accord. U.S. President Joe Biden noted explicitly that Hamas's Oct. 7, 2023 onslaught – which killed about 1,400 Israelis – was intended to "disrupt a potential normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia" [2][7]. Intelligence hints suggest the attackers (and their patrons in Tehran) were keenly aware that a U.S.-Saudi-Israeli agreement was approaching. In fact, one former Trump adviser alleged that a U.S. official's careless public "bragging" about the talks just days before the attack "gave Hamas wind of what was to come," essentially tempting them to strike [7][8]. Iranian leaders openly cheered the outcome: the deputy commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard proclaimed that Hamas had "successfully disrupted" the Saudi-Israel normalization effort, bragging that those who pursued it were now forced to back away amid the war's outrage [3][10]. Indeed, once fighting erupted in Gaza, Riyadh swiftly paused any normalization plans, pivoting to demand a ceasefire and support for Palestinian rights instead [11]. The region's narrative flipped almost overnight – instead of spotlighting a new peace, global media focused on Israel's military response in Gaza and the suffering of Palestinian civilians. For Iran and Hamas, this was a strategic win: it shifted Arab public opinion firmly against Israel and "off the table" went the Saudi-Israeli deal that might have isolated Tehran [4]. In sum, the 2023 experience suggests that highly public diplomacy in the Middle East can incur serious risks. The visibility gave Iran and its proxies both motive and opportunity to sabotage the process, in contrast to 2020 when secrecy denied them that chance.
Trump's Distancing from Israel, Embrace of Arab Partners
Facing this backdrop, Donald Trump's recent behavior indicates a deliberate shift back to a quieter, Arab-focused diplomacy – effectively minimizing Israel's public role. In October 2023, mere days after Hamas's attack, Trump broke with the traditional unwavering U.S. line by openly criticizing Netanyahu's leadership and preparedness. He even went so far as to call Hezbollah (Iran's Lebanon-based ally) "very smart", comments that drew condemnation from Israel and the White House [8]. This unvarnished rebuke of Netanyahu signaled tensions in their relationship – a surprising development considering their close alignment during Trump's first term when Netanyahu was the first foreign leader to visit the Trump White House in February 2017 [31], and Trump later made Israel his first overseas destination in May 2017 [32]. During that initial term, Trump consistently showed strong support for Israel, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israel's claims to the Golan Heights [8].
However, in his second term, Trump has publicly reaffirmed his alliance with Netanyahu, making him the first foreign leader to visit the White House in February 2025 [33]. During this visit, Trump controversially proposed that the United States "take over" and assume "long-term ownership" of the Gaza Strip, suggesting the displacement of Palestinians and redevelopment of the territory into what he called the "Riviera of the Middle East" [34]. Netanyahu praised this approach as "thinking outside the box" and said it was "worth pursuing" [35]. Despite this public display of partnership, Trump's statements and plans have also conspicuously downplayed Israel's part in his broader Middle East agenda. For example, Trump has reportedly dropped the longstanding U.S. demand that Saudi Arabia recognize Israel as a precondition for a U.S.-Saudi deal on civil nuclear cooperation [9]. In other words, Washington is no longer tying a Saudi nuclear pact or defense agreement to explicit Israeli normalization, marking a major departure from the Biden administration's approach [13][14]. By omitting Israel from the immediate equation, Trump is effectively decoupling the Saudi talks from the politically fraught Israeli-Palestinian issue. Saudi leaders have certainly taken note – after meeting Trump's team, Riyadh insiders signaled they would not be "tricked" into public normalization steps at this stage [15]. Instead, the emphasis is on building U.S.-Saudi partnerships (economic, military, nuclear) first, while keeping any Israel-related milestones quiet and on hold.
U.S. President Donald Trump (right) meets Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh. Trump's early 2025 Middle East trip has conspicuously excluded Israel, focusing instead on Gulf Arab partners. [16][15]
Trump's outreach has included effusive public praise of his Arab partners. He often boasts of his excellent relations with Gulf rulers – a dynamic on display during his May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE as his first major trip of the new term [17][18]. In Riyadh, Trump has gone along with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's requests to broaden talks beyond Israel: notably, he agreed to invite Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and other Arab leaders (from Lebanon and even Syria) to join their meeting [19][20]. This gesture serves two purposes. First, it reassures Saudi and Arab audiences that Palestinian concerns will not be completely ignored – a key factor after the Gaza war revived the centrality of the Palestinian issue. Second, it keeps Israel's involvement indirect and low-profile, at least for now. Tellingly, Trump is not stopping in Israel during this trip [16], an extraordinary departure from past U.S. diplomatic tours. Skipping Israel publicly, while engaging Arab states and even Abbas, underscores Trump's strategic distancing: he can cultivate Arab goodwill (and hammer out U.S.-Saudi deals) without the optics of standing alongside Israel's embattled leadership. All the while, Trump remains confident that he can deliver an eventual peace pact. He has predicted that a Saudi-Israeli normalization will happen "very quickly" when the time is right [21] – but crucially, he intends to present it as a pleasant surprise à la 2020, not as a drawn-out spectacle. In sum, Trump's current posture – cooling towards Netanyahu, prioritizing Arab partners, and omitting Israel from front-stage discussion – aligns closely with a return to secretive, back-channel diplomacy aimed at avoiding the 2023-style fallout.
Secret Diplomacy vs. Public Negotiations: Logic and Precedent
Trump's apparent belief that "secret diplomacy" yields better results in the Middle East has substantial precedent to back it. Historical examples consistently show that when breakthrough agreements were negotiated covertly, they faced fewer disruptions and succeeded in reshaping the region's landscape. Beyond the Abraham Accords' clandestine crafting [1], one can point to the 1978 Camp David talks between Israel and Egypt – conducted in seclusion at a Maryland lodge – which produced a peace treaty that has endured for over 40 years. Likewise, the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israelis and Palestinians began as secret meetings in Norway, catching the world by surprise when a framework was suddenly announced.
The rationale is pretty straightforward: keeping negotiations quiet allows leaders to make concessions and build trust away from public pressures and propaganda. In the Middle East, public opinion can be a minefield; premature publicity gives hardliners (be they Iranian proxies, extremist militants, or domestic opposition parties) time to organize attacks – political or literal – to sabotage an unwelcome deal. The 2023 Saudi-Israel effort starkly illustrated this risk: "the region was abuzz" with talk of the impending deal, which all but invited Iran and Hamas to make a violent attempt to stop it [4]. By contrast, secret talks deny those spoilers a clear target until it's too late. As one analysis noted, for Hamas and Iran it is a victory when focus shifts to Israel's military actions rather than to Israeli-Arab peace plans [22]. Secret diplomacy aims to prevent that focus shift until the agreement is a fait accompli. It is telling that even veteran diplomats like John Kerry once insisted there could be "no separate peace" with Arabs without the Palestinians – yet Trump's team proved that wrong by quietly arranging exactly such separate peace deals. In doing so, however, they also proved Kerry's underlying caution: ignoring the Palestinian issue entirely can undermine the sustainability of peace. Today's situation – a war that erupted partly out of Palestinian desperation and Iranian opportunism – highlights that while secret diplomacy is more effective at clinching agreements, it is not a panacea for long-term stability. The most durable Middle East accords have combined discretion in negotiation with at least some buy-in from key stakeholders to prevent backlash. Thus, the logic for Trump returning to secrecy is solid (get the deal done first, without interference), but it must be tempered by lessons learned: excluding core issues like Palestine can sow seeds of future conflict [23][24][25].
When Will Saudi-Israel Normalization Resume?
Given the current climate, any open push for Saudi-Israeli normalization is effectively on hold. Saudi Arabia's priorities shifted dramatically after October 7, 2023 – from inching toward Israel to "making it conditional on a ceasefire" in Gaza, rebuilding the Strip, and even movement toward a Palestinian state [11]. In other words, Riyadh will not normalize with Israel while images of war in Gaza dominate headlines and Arab public sentiment is inflamed. Saudi officials have reinforced this stance in diplomatic exchanges, reportedly telling their U.S. counterparts that normalization must wait until the guns fall silent and ”Palestinian grievances are addressed” [26][27]. Practically speaking, this means a formal Saudi-Israel deal is unlikely until two key conditions are met: (1) a halt or resolution to the Gaza conflict (at minimum a durable ceasefire), and (2) the conclusion of the U.S.-Saudi strategic bargain (particularly the civil nuclear cooperation and security guarantees).
The Trump administration appears to recognize this timeline. By decoupling the nuclear talks from immediate Israeli normalization [13], Washington can forge ahead with Saudi Arabia on a bilateral pact – which itself may take time given complex issues like uranium enrichment limits [28]. Once a U.S.-Saudi deal is sealed and the regional tension over Gaza eases, the stage would be far better set for Saudi Arabia to quietly re-engage on normalization. Any earlier attempt would be premature: as of early 2025, "progress toward Saudi recognition of Israel has been halted by fury in Arab countries over the war in Gaza" [15].
This pause could actually bolster the case for Trump's secret diplomacy. It gives all parties time to let passions cool. We may well see shuttle diplomacy behind closed doors over the coming months – U.S. envoys meeting Israeli and Saudi officials separately to sketch out a framework in principle, ready to roll out when conditions ripen. In fact, Trump's optimistic claim that a Saudi-Israeli accord will come "very quickly" suggests he envisages flipping the switch at the opportune moment [21]. Likely, that moment will be after a Gaza ceasefire or peace deal reassures the Arab street, and after the U.S. has secured its own strategic interests with Riyadh. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, for his part, has incentives to eventually normalize (access to Israeli technology and defense, a strengthened front against Iran), but he has made clear that Palestinian aspirations and regional stability cannot be ignored. Thus, the most plausible scenario is a two-stage process: first, a U.S.-Saudi agreement (possibly including U.S. help on a peaceful nuclear program and defense pact) without mentioning Israel; second, a resumption of Israel-Saudi normalization talks behind closed doors, culminating in a surprise announcement once the Gaza crisis abates. As one regional expert quipped, Israeli-Saudi normalization has become a "collateral victim" of the October 7 war – but not a permanent one [29][30]. With careful, quiet maneuvering, it can be revived when the smoke clears.
My Takeaway
I see it pretty much as follows: Trump isn't distancing himself from Israel out of spite or ideology. He's playing a longer, smarter game.
In 2020, secrecy brought surprise, and surprise brought results. The Abraham Accords caught the world off guard because they were designed that way. In 2023, the opposite happened. Talks were leaked, the region was flooded with speculation, and Iran saw an opportunity. October 7 wasn't just a horrible terror attack, but a deliberate move to derail normalization and draw Israel into a war it couldn't avoid. It worked.
Now, Trump seems determined not to let that happen again. By keeping Israel out of the headlines and focusing first on a U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal, he's creating space to rebuild momentum—without giving adversaries an easy target. The logic is sound: seal the strategic framework quietly, then return to normalization when the timing favors success.
If there's a lesson here, it's that normalization must move forward on its own terms—not as a hostage to those who use violence as leverage.
So yes, I think Trump's approach is calculated. I think it could work. And if it does, it will be precisely because this time, the strategy matches the threat.
This is a fascinating analysis of how Middle East diplomacy thrives—or falters—based on visibility. The contrast between the Abraham Accords' secrecy (and success) and the 2023 Saudi-Israel talks' public unraveling is striking. It underscores a key lesson: in a region where spoilers like Iran and Hamas are quick to exploit divisions, discretion isn’t just strategic—it’s essential.
Trump’s pivot toward quieter, Arab-centric diplomacy while sidelining Israel’s public role seems like a deliberate recalibration. By decoupling the U.S.-Saudi deal from immediate normalization, he’s avoiding the pitfalls of 2023 while laying groundwork for a future breakthrough. The emphasis on bilateral partnerships (nuclear, defense) first, with normalization as a later ‘surprise,’ mirrors the Abraham Accords’ playbook—minus the Palestinian blind spot that fueled backlash.
Your point about timing is critical: a Gaza ceasefire and U.S.-Saudi pact may be prerequisites, but the real test will be whether quiet diplomacy can address Palestinian grievances enough to sustain long-term stability. If Trump can thread that needle—balancing secrecy with inclusivity—this approach could indeed revive normalization when the moment is right.
Insightful read, and a compelling case for why sometimes, the best deals are the ones negotiated in the shadows."
Really well-written, but the Palestinian voice feels sidelined here, just as it was in the Abraham Accords. Trump’s inclusion of Abbas in talks is a gesture, but the “Riviera” plan sounds like a nonstarter for Palestinians. If normalization hinges on Gaza’s resolution, shouldn’t Palestinian leaders have a bigger seat at the table? How do you see their role evolving in these secret talks?